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Article: Benefit sharing for BIM implementation: Tackling the moral hazard dilemma in inter-firm cooperation

TitleBenefit sharing for BIM implementation: Tackling the moral hazard dilemma in inter-firm cooperation
Authors
KeywordsBuilding information modeling
Evolutionary game model
Inter-firm cooperation
Moral hazards
Principal–agent theory
Issue Date2017
PublisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman
Citation
International Journal of Project Management, 2017, v. 35 n. 3, p. 393-405 How to Cite?
AbstractBuilding information modeling (BIM) plays an important role in furthering value-creation of construction projects by advocating the inter-firm cooperation. When implementing BIM, however, individual firms inherently safeguard their self-interests regardless of the fact that inter-firm cooperation might reap joint BIM benefits for a project overall, which epitomizes a typical problem of moral hazards in project-based organizations. This paper develops an outcome-linked benefit sharing model that considers sharing joint BIM benefits among stakeholders including designers, contractors, and clients for tracking moral hazards therein. By modeling stakeholders' behaviors as evolutionary games within a principal–agent formalism, it has been deducted that (1) designers/contractors could be incentivized to cooperate had each stakeholder received a share higher than the quotient of BIM costs over value-creation in the design/construction phase; and (2) how joint BIM benefits can be more than noncooperation outcomes is key for clients to support BIM implementation.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/239579
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 7.4
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.039
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZheng, L-
dc.contributor.authorLu, W-
dc.contributor.authorChen, K-
dc.contributor.authorChau, KW-
dc.contributor.authorNiu, Y-
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-21T09:16:07Z-
dc.date.available2017-03-21T09:16:07Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Project Management, 2017, v. 35 n. 3, p. 393-405-
dc.identifier.issn0263-7863-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/239579-
dc.description.abstractBuilding information modeling (BIM) plays an important role in furthering value-creation of construction projects by advocating the inter-firm cooperation. When implementing BIM, however, individual firms inherently safeguard their self-interests regardless of the fact that inter-firm cooperation might reap joint BIM benefits for a project overall, which epitomizes a typical problem of moral hazards in project-based organizations. This paper develops an outcome-linked benefit sharing model that considers sharing joint BIM benefits among stakeholders including designers, contractors, and clients for tracking moral hazards therein. By modeling stakeholders' behaviors as evolutionary games within a principal–agent formalism, it has been deducted that (1) designers/contractors could be incentivized to cooperate had each stakeholder received a share higher than the quotient of BIM costs over value-creation in the design/construction phase; and (2) how joint BIM benefits can be more than noncooperation outcomes is key for clients to support BIM implementation.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman-
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Project Management-
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.-
dc.subjectBuilding information modeling-
dc.subjectEvolutionary game model-
dc.subjectInter-firm cooperation-
dc.subjectMoral hazards-
dc.subjectPrincipal–agent theory-
dc.titleBenefit sharing for BIM implementation: Tackling the moral hazard dilemma in inter-firm cooperation-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailZheng, L: lizzheng@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailLu, W: wilsonlu@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailChau, KW: hrrbckw@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityLu, W=rp01362-
dc.identifier.authorityChau, KW=rp00993-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.006-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85010191042-
dc.identifier.hkuros271643-
dc.identifier.volume35-
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage393-
dc.identifier.epage405-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000397074100013-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-
dc.identifier.issnl0263-7863-

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