From Velvet Revolutions of 1989 to “Velvet Occupations” of 2014: Europe’s Soft Power and the Geopolitics of Putin’s Russia

Abstract

The Velvet Revolutions of 1989 accelerated the European project both in its intensity and scope. Almost the entire continent was to be united in its pursuit of liberty and the rule of law. The high point of soft-power Europe may have been reached in May 2004, when ten new countries – eight of them emerging from communist rule – were admitted as full EU members. Later that year, Ukraine experienced its Orange revolution, which promised Ukrainians a return to Europe, emulating in form and objectives the success of their Central European neighbours. While the Ukrainian revolution of 2004 lost its way, it attracted the most unlikely followers. In response to the threat of democratic ideals infecting Russia, Vladimir Putin and his ideologues engineered a veritable ‘velvet counter-revolution’. The spectre of a Moscow Maidan was to be kept at bay by state-sponsored public mobilisation, which gave rise to a nationalist project with distinctly imperial dimensions. Echoing this logic, a ‘preventive counter-revolution’ (Horvath 2013) culminated in the ‘velvet occupation’ of Crimea in 2014. Fake public mobilisation of Russian citizens (i.e. the rise of youth organisation Nashi) presaged the fake war in Ukraine. This marks the end of the ‘soft power Europe’ paradigm. When faced with the imperialist ambitions of Putin’s Russia, the EU appears impotent. This constellation is exceedingly dangerous. While scholars in the West continue to praise Europe as a ‘quiet’ superpower (Moravcsik 2010), Russian scholars and opinion-makers are scornful, celebrating instead ‘the decline of Gayropa’ (Riabov & Riabova 2014). The aim of my paper is to discuss the clash of two worldviews – the postmodern, postnational, post-conflictual world that West Europeans grew accustomed to (represented by the likes of Jürgen Habermas and Anthony Giddens) versus the Schmittian, confrontational, neo-imperial world of Eurasianism in Russia (i.e. Alexander Dugin). I will argue that the lack of power can be as destabilizing as the excess of power: Europe’s weakness is Russia’s strength. To live up to its true purpose and values (as embodied in the 1989 revolutions), Europe should stand united against Putin’s geopolitics.