Why Does New Hampshire Matter: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Election with Multiple Candidates

Abstract

In a multi-candidate election, a voter may prefer to vote for his second choice in order to defeat his least favorite candidate. I study a model in which voters know their own preference but infer support of each candidate from a private signal. I show that if private signals are su¢ ciently precise, an equilibrium exists and is unique in the limit as the size of the electorate increases. In this unique equlibrium, supporters of a candidate vote more strategically when their hate for their worst choice becomes more domi- nant, but they vote less strategically when the same is true for the opposite camp. Using this property, I show that in sequential primaries, winning early primaries improves a candidate s chance of winning later primaries by making his supporters in later primaries vote more sincerely. I show that sequential primaries help with coordination, but puts more weight on the preference of the median voters in the early primaries. When voters worry enough about defeating their worst choice, sequential primaries are better at aggregating preferences than simultaneous primaries.