File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: The political economy of intra-provincial disparities in post-reform China: A case study of Jiangsu province

TitleThe political economy of intra-provincial disparities in post-reform China: A case study of Jiangsu province
Authors
KeywordsIntra-provincial disparities
Jiangsu province
Political economy
Post-reform China
Preferential policy
Socialist market economy
Issue Date2001
PublisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum
Citation
Geoforum, 2001, v. 32 n. 2, p. 215-234 How to Cite?
AbstractSince 1978, China has introduced economic reforms and open policies for some people and places to get rich first, in the hope of redistributing wealth eventually. In reality, disparities between and within regions, urban and rural areas, and different social strata have increased. This paper attempts to explore the underlying factors of intra-provincial disparities through a case study of Jiangsu Province. Socio-economic and cultural data have shown that Jiangsu Province can roughly be divided into three parts: the developed southern Jiangsu, moderately developed mid-Jiangsu, and poor northern Jiangsu. Historically, southern Jiangsu is the more developed part of the Province. This intra-provincial disparity has enlarged during the post-reform era. The preferential policies for the coastal regions and non-state owned economic sectors have led to the emergence of pluralistic ownership patterns and a faster pace of development in localities along the coast, close to big cities, or having a long history of township-and-village-enterprise (TVE) development. A case in point is southern Jiangsu. Moreover, the transition from a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy necessitated decentralisation of administrative and economic power. As the decentralisation of power is not fully guaranteed or stipulated by law, local protectionism emerges. Through relations (guan xi), investors are able to manipulate preferential policies to carry out large-scale rent-seeking activities. The fiscal capacity of the central and provincial governments, however, is weakened, diminishing its ability to redistribute resources for a more even regional development. © 2001 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/89762
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 3.4
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.338
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLong, Gen_HK
dc.contributor.authorNg, MKen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T10:01:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T10:01:29Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_HK
dc.identifier.citationGeoforum, 2001, v. 32 n. 2, p. 215-234en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0016-7185en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/89762-
dc.description.abstractSince 1978, China has introduced economic reforms and open policies for some people and places to get rich first, in the hope of redistributing wealth eventually. In reality, disparities between and within regions, urban and rural areas, and different social strata have increased. This paper attempts to explore the underlying factors of intra-provincial disparities through a case study of Jiangsu Province. Socio-economic and cultural data have shown that Jiangsu Province can roughly be divided into three parts: the developed southern Jiangsu, moderately developed mid-Jiangsu, and poor northern Jiangsu. Historically, southern Jiangsu is the more developed part of the Province. This intra-provincial disparity has enlarged during the post-reform era. The preferential policies for the coastal regions and non-state owned economic sectors have led to the emergence of pluralistic ownership patterns and a faster pace of development in localities along the coast, close to big cities, or having a long history of township-and-village-enterprise (TVE) development. A case in point is southern Jiangsu. Moreover, the transition from a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy necessitated decentralisation of administrative and economic power. As the decentralisation of power is not fully guaranteed or stipulated by law, local protectionism emerges. Through relations (guan xi), investors are able to manipulate preferential policies to carry out large-scale rent-seeking activities. The fiscal capacity of the central and provincial governments, however, is weakened, diminishing its ability to redistribute resources for a more even regional development. © 2001 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforumen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofGeoforumen_HK
dc.subjectIntra-provincial disparitiesen_HK
dc.subjectJiangsu provinceen_HK
dc.subjectPolitical economyen_HK
dc.subjectPost-reform Chinaen_HK
dc.subjectPreferential policyen_HK
dc.subjectSocialist market economyen_HK
dc.titleThe political economy of intra-provincial disparities in post-reform China: A case study of Jiangsu provinceen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0016-7185&volume=32&issue=2&spage=215&epage=234&date=2001&atitle=The+Political+Economy+of+Intra-provincial+Disparities+in+Post-reform+China:+a+Case+Study+of+Jiangsu+Provinceen_HK
dc.identifier.emailNg, MK: meekng@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityNg, MK=rp01015en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0016-7185(00)00030-0en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0035039967en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros59331en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0035039967&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume32en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage215en_HK
dc.identifier.epage234en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000167615000006-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLong, G=15744016100en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridNg, MK=7202076324en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl0016-7185-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats