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Article: Game-theoretic analysis of China's WTO accession

TitleGame-theoretic analysis of China's WTO accession
Authors
Bond, EWChing, SLai, ELC
KeywordsWTO
Accession
Negotiation
Issue Date2003
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Asia. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/PER
Citation
Pacific Economic Review, 2003, v. 8 n. 2, p. 117-125 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2003.00214.x
AbstractThis paper studies the determination of split of total surplus among the negotiating parties (member countries and the acceding country) in a WTO accession negotiation using a sequential bargaining model. In particular, we are interested in the effect of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle on the negotiation outcome. The MFN principle says that any tariff reduction offered by the applicant for accession has to be automatically granted to all existing members. The model suggests that it is quite plausible that China's share of surplus is more when MFN is in place.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85543
ISSN
1361-374X
2023 Impact Factor: 1.1
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.511
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBond, EWen_HK
dc.contributor.authorChing, Sen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLai, ELCen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:06:23Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:06:23Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_HK
dc.identifier.citationPacific Economic Review, 2003, v. 8 n. 2, p. 117-125en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1361-374Xen_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85543-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the determination of split of total surplus among the negotiating parties (member countries and the acceding country) in a WTO accession negotiation using a sequential bargaining model. In particular, we are interested in the effect of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle on the negotiation outcome. The MFN principle says that any tariff reduction offered by the applicant for accession has to be automatically granted to all existing members. The model suggests that it is quite plausible that China's share of surplus is more when MFN is in place.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Asia. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/PERen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofPacific Economic Reviewen_HK
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.-
dc.subjectWTO-
dc.subjectAccession-
dc.subjectNegotiation-
dc.titleGame-theoretic analysis of China's WTO accessionen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=1361-374X&volume=8 &issue=2&spage=117&epage=125&date=2003&atitle=Game-Theoretic+Analysis+of+China%27s+WTO+Accessionen_HK
dc.identifier.emailChing, S: steve.ching@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChing, S=rp01056en_HK
dc.description.naturepreprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-0106.2003.00214.x-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0038606553en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros94263en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0038606553&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume8en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage117en_HK
dc.identifier.epage125en_HK
dc.publisher.placeAustraliaen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridBond, EW=7005355519en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChing, S=16411142700en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLai, ELC=7201466555en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl1361-374X-

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