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Article: A more substantive neuron doctrine

TitleA more substantive neuron doctrine
Authors
Issue Date1999
PublisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=BBS
Citation
Behavioral And Brain Sciences, 1999, v. 22 n. 5, p. 843-844 How to Cite?
AbstractFirst, it is not clear from Gold and Stoljar's definition of biological neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel's theory is problematic. If not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is available. Second, objections to the psychological sciences might derive not just from the conflation of the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. There might also be the implicit belief that, for many mental phenomena, adequate theories must invoke neurophysiological concepts and cannot be purely psychological.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/43153
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 16.6
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.534
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLau, JYFen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2007-03-23T04:40:11Z-
dc.date.available2007-03-23T04:40:11Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_HK
dc.identifier.citationBehavioral And Brain Sciences, 1999, v. 22 n. 5, p. 843-844en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0140-525Xen_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/43153-
dc.description.abstractFirst, it is not clear from Gold and Stoljar's definition of biological neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel's theory is problematic. If not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is available. Second, objections to the psychological sciences might derive not just from the conflation of the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. There might also be the implicit belief that, for many mental phenomena, adequate theories must invoke neurophysiological concepts and cannot be purely psychological.en_HK
dc.format.extent54099 bytes-
dc.format.extent2028 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=BBSen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofBehavioral and Brain Sciencesen_HK
dc.rightsBehavioral and Brain Sciences. Copyright © Cambridge University Press.en_HK
dc.titleA more substantive neuron doctrineen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0140-525X&volume=22&issue=5&spage=843&epage=844&date=1999&atitle=A+more+substantive+neuron+doctrineen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLau, JYF: jyflau@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLau, JYF=rp01223en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_HK
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0140525X99382194en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0033401252en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros45365-
dc.identifier.volume22en_HK
dc.identifier.issue5en_HK
dc.identifier.spage843en_HK
dc.identifier.epage844en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000084777500059-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, JYF=35346394100en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl0140-525X-

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