Promotion bottlenecks and demographic cycles : understanding bureaucratic aging in China

Abstract

This Ph.D. dissertation comprises three independent yet thematically interconnected chapters on organizational demography and personnel dynamics within hierarchical bureaucracies, with a particular focus on the Chinese political system. Collectively, the chapters investigate how internal labor market (ILM) structures and age-based promotion rules shape long-term leadership composition, career trajectories, and institutional renewal. Chapter 1 presents empirical evidence for the existence of an internal labor market within the Chinese bureaucracy. Drawing on original biographical data for 1,698 prefecture-level Party Secretaries from 1999 to 2017, the chapter identifies key features of China’s cadre management system that align with ILM characteristics, including rigid hierarchical promotion, limited external recruitment, and well-defined internal career pathways. The findings suggest that promotion is driven not only by open competition but also by structured vacancy chains and tenure-based progression. A central observation is the progressive aging of Party Secretaries over time, marked by the near disappearance of appointments to this position before the age of 45. The chapter argues that this trend is not incidental but a systemic outcome of ILM constraints. This analysis contributes to the literature by reframing bureaucratic aging as a predictable result of institutional design. Chapter 2 extends this inquiry by examining the demographic consequences of youth-oriented promotion policies. Building on the ILM framework, it explores a paradox within China’s bureaucratic system: initial rejuvenation followed by long-term re-aging. While age-based promotion rules initially succeed in advancing younger cadres, they ultimately generate bottlenecks as early-promoted officials occupy senior positions for extended periods. This delays turnover and limits promotion opportunities for subsequent cohorts. As the pool of promotable young candidates diminishes, older individuals are reintroduced into leadership roles, producing demographic reversals that undermine the policy’s original objectives. The chapter underscores the unintended consequences of age-based promotion within rule-bound hierarchies and emphasizes the institutional trade-offs inherent in succession planning. Chapter 3 develops a dynamic model to formally examine the mechanisms driving these demographic patterns. The model demonstrates that even within systems governed by fixed retirement ages and standardized promotion criteria, stable age structures are rarely stable. Rather, the organization exhibits intrinsic demographic cycles shaped by entry timing, promotion rules, and the cascading logic of vacancy chains. These cycles produce structurally determined career trajectories—ranging from accelerated promotion to prolonged stagnation—depending solely on the phase of the demographic cycle at the time of entry. This analysis advances existing ILM and vacancy chain theories by showing how organizational design can generate significant disparities in outcomes among otherwise equivalent individuals. It also offers an explanation for the divergent aging patterns observed across institutions with similar formal rules. Taken together, the three chapters offer a comprehensive analysis of how personnel regulations and hierarchical structures jointly shape organizational demography. They also yield broader insights into the design of public institutions, the challenges of succession planning, and the management of aging workforces within bureaucratic systems.