The problem of loneliness and the place of teleological action in friendship

Abstract

A duty to address loneliness raises questions about the nature of friendship, particularly whether relationships formed to address loneliness can be considered genuine friendships. Philosophers including Michael Stocker, Kieren Setiya, and David Velleman suggest that true friendship arises primarily out of regard for the other in the absence of goals external to that. This paper, however, argues that friendships formed out of duty or self-interest, such as the need for connection, need not be deemed inferior. Drawing on Kant’s notion of a duty of friendship, I challenge Stocker’s critique that acting for ends undermines the authenticity of friendship. I argue that goals and duties can coexist with genuine concern in acts of friendship, offering a more inclusive understanding of human relationships. This supports the language of rights and duties related to loneliness while providing a normative-psychological framework for fostering meaningful connections. While friendship is not primarily goal-oriented, the presence of goals and duties does not negate its authenticity.