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- Publisher Website: 10.1093/mind/fzae050
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Article: KK is Wrong Because We Say So
| Title | KK is Wrong Because We Say So |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Issue Date | 1-Jan-2025 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Citation | Mind, 2025, v. 134, n. 533, p. 33-59 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | This paper offers a new argument against the KK thesis, which says that if you know p, then you know that you know p. We argue that KK is inconsistent with the fact that anyone denies the KK thesis: imagine that Dudley says he knows p but that he does not have 100 iterations of knowledge about p. If KK were true, Dudley would know that he has 100 iterations of knowledge about p, and so he wouldn’t deny that he did. We consider several epicycles, and also explore whether the argument type also challenges other structural conditions on knowledge, such as closure under deduction. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/362893 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.8 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.615 |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Goldstein, Simon | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Hawthorne, John | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-10-03T00:35:52Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-10-03T00:35:52Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-01-01 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Mind, 2025, v. 134, n. 533, p. 33-59 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0026-4423 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/362893 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper offers a new argument against the KK thesis, which says that if you know p, then you know that you know p. We argue that KK is inconsistent with the fact that anyone denies the KK thesis: imagine that Dudley says he knows p but that he does not have 100 iterations of knowledge about p. If KK were true, Dudley would know that he has 100 iterations of knowledge about p, and so he wouldn’t deny that he did. We consider several epicycles, and also explore whether the argument type also challenges other structural conditions on knowledge, such as closure under deduction. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Mind | - |
| dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
| dc.title | KK is Wrong Because We Say So | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/mind/fzae050 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85216362370 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 134 | - |
| dc.identifier.issue | 533 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 33 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 59 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1460-2113 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 0026-4423 | - |
