Mind and World in Xunzi

Abstract

<p>Xunzi 荀子 develops a sophisticated metaethics, semantic theory and epistemology according to which the content of language and thought is determined through socially coordinated, norm-governed activity directed at fulfilling human interests. Xunzi sees this activity as subject to causal constraints imposed by the natural environment, which determine the success or failure of what we do. The result is an intriguing approach to explaining the content of what we say and think that leaves no space for a gap to open up between mind and world. For on Xunzi’s picture, even failed activity engages with the world, and the diachronic nature of causal constraints on our activity ensures repeated, ongoing opportunities to correct cognitive error. In this talk, I sketch the Xunzi’s view of how the mind relates to the world and highlight its distinctive features through a comparison with the widely discussed “Naturalized Platonism” of John McDowell. Xunzi’s approach, I suggest, offers fundamental advantages over McDowell’s. An intriguing consequence of a Xunzian approach is a shift in the focus of epistemology to the role of epistemic virtues such as competence, judiciousness and conscientiousness.</p>

荀子发展出一种复杂的后设伦理学、语言哲学和认识论，主张言思的内容是通过社会协调、规范管理等活动来确定的。这些活动旨在实现人类的利益，同时受到自然环境施加的有因果关系的约束，决定了我们所做事情的成败。荀子认为心灵与世界之间无存缝隙。在其视野中，即便是失败的活动也触及了真实的世界，且约束活动的历时性确保了我们有反复、持续纠正错误认知的机会。通过勾勒出荀子有关心灵与世界关系的观念，并与约翰·麦克道尔提出的“自然论的柏拉图主义”相比较，得以突出前者的独特性与优越性。此外，可知荀子式的进路，已然转向以与认知有关的美德为导向，如“慎”“虚”“一”“静”等。