Essays on selected aspects of western influences : modern occupational and judicial developments in early twentieth-century China

Abstract

This dissertation studies modern occupational and judicial development in early twentieth-century China under the Western influences. The first chapter provides a first empirical test of the “Needham Question”, which attributes China’s economic backwardness to the “uselessness” of knowledge (i.e., the Confucian classics) that undergirded the millennia-old civil service examination (keju), against the powerful incentives generated by exam success. By analysing a uniquely constructed dataset on the emerging modern occupations that spanned the late 19th- and early 20th-centuries China, we provide evidence of a horizontal transmission of human capital: specifically, prefectures with a higher density of jinshi are significantly associated with more employees in the modern professions such as doctors, engineers, bankers, etc. Additionally, we also find evidence of a vertical transmission through successful lineages and families, using prefecture-(rare) surname as identifier. Moreover, traditional human capital also importantly determines occupational choice: it is significantly correlated with selection into the occupations of doctors and engineers than bankers, lawyers, and other non-technical occupations – dispelling the claim that the Confucian classics may have had the persistent effect of biasing one’s occupational choice away from the scientific disciplines. This suggests that once the right incentives were provided, rational individuals could quickly adjust to learn what was "useful" for the economy, providing evidence and support for the Needham hypothesis. The second chapter examines the emergence and economic consequences of a modern legal system in a traditional society by investigating a unique historical context: the development of an independent judiciary in China during the early 20th century. We focus on a judicial reform initiated in 1906, which aimed to introduce a modern legal framework to resolve disputes between Chinese citizens and foreigners which had increased dramatically since 1840s. The reform was marked by a conscious establishment of an independent judiciary that was separated from the executive branch – the first time in Chinese history – resulting in the establishment of independent courts, albeit with varying degrees of success across space and over time. Using a unique dataset constructed from newspaper reports on disputes between Chinese and foreigners, we find that prefectures beset with more frequent disputes were more inclined to set up modern court systems. In addition, when compared to government departments that remained unreformed and where the executive branch continued to adjudicate disputes, the modern courts demonstrated greater efficiency in handling lawsuits. Furthermore, prefectures with more modern courts typically saw accelerated economic growth. Our findings highlight that the pressing need to address escalating new-formed conflicts is a key driving force for the adoption of modern legal institutions within a traditional society.