Analysis of maritime accident governance behaviors based on evolutionary game theory and system dynamics

Abstract

<p>Current research on maritime accident governance lacks a systematic framework to capture the dynamic interaction mechanisms among governments, shipping companies, and crew members—particularly in analyzing how their conflicting objectives evolve across development stages. This study breaks through the limitations of traditional static models by innovatively integrating evolutionary game theory, system dynamics, and industry lifecycle theory to construct a tripartite dynamic governance model. The dynamic evolutionary processes of stakeholders' strategic choices under different scenarios and their sensitivity to key parameters are analyzed. The results indicate that the government plays a dominant role in the process of maritime accident governance, assuming different roles at various stages. The cost of crew members' safety behaviors is crucial for promoting effective governance, and the government should rationally control subsidies to accelerate the transition of maritime accident governance to a mature stage. By integrating evolutionary game theory with system dynamics, this study innovatively constructs a comprehensive dynamic decision-making model, it offers practical insights and effective strategies for policymakers to promote maritime accident governance. The proposed methodology extends conventional static risk assessment paradigms, offering actionable strategies for safety-critical infrastructure governance across transportation, energy, and chemical industries.</p>