Development strategies for green methanol in the shipping industry with government subsidies: An analysis based on evolutionary game and system dynamics

Abstract

<p>The reduction of carbon emissions in the shipping industry is a dual imperative, driven by government mandates and the intrinsic pursuit of sustainable development by ports and shipping companies. This study introduces green methanol as a pivotal environmental innovation in this context. Utilizing evolutionary game theory and system dynamics, we examine the decision-making behaviors and interactive mechanisms among governments, port enterprises, and shipping companies concerning the adoption of green methanol. We establish a tripartite evolutionary game model to derive evolutionarily stable strategies and their corresponding conditions. Numerical simulations are employed to analyze the dynamic evolution of strategic choices under various scenarios and their sensitivity to key parameters. Our findings indicate that the government plays a crucial role at different stages of green methanol development. The cost structure of green methanol is critical for its application and transformation within the shipping industry. Government penalties for fraudulent subsidies should be adjusted dynamically based on market maturity. In the early stages, costs should be controlled and incentives increased to boost market acceptance and participation. As the market matures, costs can be appropriately raised to encourage self-regulation. This study innovatively combines evolutionary game theory with system dynamics to construct a comprehensive dynamic decision-making model. It provides deep insights and effective strategies for policymakers aiming to promote green methanol ships through unique parameter design and equilibrium point selection. The insights gained are not only applicable to green methanol but also offer a theoretical framework for developing other new energy sources, aiding in the timely achievement of carbon emission reduction targets.</p>