File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1080/02698595.2023.2277999
- WOS: WOS:001105354200001
- Find via
Supplementary
-
Citations:
- Web of Science: 0
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Massive Modularity: An Ontological Hypothesis or an Adaptationist Discovery Heuristic?
| Title | Massive Modularity: An Ontological Hypothesis or an Adaptationist Discovery Heuristic? |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Issue Date | 7-Nov-2023 |
| Publisher | Taylor and Francis Group |
| Citation | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2023, v. 36, n. 4, p. 317-334 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | Cognitive modules are internal mental structures. Some theorists and empirical researchers hypothesise that the human mind is either partially or massively comprised of structures that are modular in nature. Is the massive modularity of mind hypothesis a cogent view about the ontological nature of human mind or is it, rather, an effective/ineffective adaptationist discovery heuristic for generating predictively successful hypotheses about both heretofore unknown psychological traits and unknown properties of already identified psychological traits? Considering the inadequacies of the case in favour of massive modularity as an ontological hypothesis, I suggest approaching and valuing massive modularity as an adaptationist discovery heuristic. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/357165 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.7 2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.240 |
| ISI Accession Number ID |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Villena, David | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-06-23T08:53:44Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-06-23T08:53:44Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023-11-07 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2023, v. 36, n. 4, p. 317-334 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0269-8595 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/357165 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | <p>Cognitive modules are internal mental structures. Some theorists and empirical researchers hypothesise that the human mind is either partially or massively comprised of structures that are modular in nature. Is the massive modularity of mind hypothesis a cogent view about the ontological nature of human mind or is it, rather, an effective/ineffective adaptationist discovery heuristic for generating predictively successful hypotheses about both heretofore unknown psychological traits and unknown properties of already identified psychological traits? Considering the inadequacies of the case in favour of massive modularity as an ontological hypothesis, I suggest approaching and valuing massive modularity as an adaptationist discovery heuristic.<br></p> | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Taylor and Francis Group | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science | - |
| dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
| dc.title | Massive Modularity: An Ontological Hypothesis or an Adaptationist Discovery Heuristic? | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/02698595.2023.2277999 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 36 | - |
| dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 317 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 334 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1469-9281 | - |
| dc.identifier.isi | WOS:001105354200001 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 0269-8595 | - |