The role of divine grace in Kant’s rational religion

Abstract

Kant’s rational religion has been described as a failure because his idea of redemption contains contradictory appeals to human responsibility and divine assistance. For example, John Hare has argued that Kant cannot explain how human beings can bridge a moral gap between an ideal state of virtue and an imperfect disposition. In this paper, I defend Kant from this criticism, arguing that his rational religion is coherent: human agency and divine assistance may each contribute to redemption without inconsistency. I argue that divine grace may be operative for Kant through the gradual process of character formation, in addition to the instantaneous change of heart, providing an alternative explanation of how the moral gap may be bridged. I compare this account with Erasmus’s account of free will and divine grace, arguing that each account employs a similar strategy and structure to explain the operation of grace. Though Kant’s position is not identical with historical (orthodox) Christianity, he holds that reason is necessarily religious in orientation and must remain open to the possibility that divine grace is necessary for moral improvement.