The politics of higher education in China: the signal–response mechanism, downward tiered pressure escalation, and the Double First-Class University Initiative

Abstract

This article examines the politics of higher education in China drawing on empirical data collected from three elite universities listed in the ‘Double First-Class University Initiative’. We investigate how a ‘signal–response’ mechanism, in which the country’s top leaders signal broad policy goals and subordinate officials respond, works in China’s higher education arena. To address the uncertainties caused by vague signals and avoid blame for failure to fulfil policy goals, a strategy involving a gradual downward increase of implementation pressure within the bureaucratic hierarchy, termed cengceng jiama (层层加码), has been adopted. Universities and their faculties/departments now establish their own ‘up-or-leave’ systems to remove underperforming researchers, apply more stringent criteria when assessing faculty members’ publication rates, and discriminate against domestically trained PhDs when hiring. Consequently, faculty members, especially those in the younger generation, often experience high levels of anxiety, insecurity and inequality, which can hinder their development as scholars.

通过分析从三所列入‘双一流大学建设计划’的精英大学收集到的实证数据，本文探讨了中国的高等教育政治。我们探究‘指示—响应’机制在中国高等教育领域的运作方式，在这一机制中，国家最高领导层指示宽泛的政策目标，下级官员则做出响应。为了应对模糊的指令所带来的不确定性，同时避免因政策目标未能实现而受到指责，一种被称之为‘层层加码’的策略被采用，即在官僚层级内向下逐步加大执行压力。目前，中国的大学及其院系建立了自己的‘非升即走’制度，以撤换表现不佳的研究人员，并采用更严格的标准去评估教职人员的论文发表量，同时在招聘时歧视国内毕业的博士。因此，中国的高校教职人员，尤其是青年学者，常常受到不平等的对待，而且往往经历巨大的焦虑和不安全感，这可能会阻碍他们作为学者的未来发展。