Revisiting representativeness heuristic classic paradigms: Replication and extensions of nine experiments in Kahneman and Tversky (1972)

Abstract

<p>Kahneman and Tversky showed that when people make probability judgements, they tend to ignore relevant statistical information (e.g., sample size) and instead rely on a representativeness heuristic, whereby subjective probabilities are influenced by the degree to which a target is perceived as similar to (representative of) a typical example of the relevant population, class or category. Their article has become a cornerstone in many lines of research and has been used to account for various biases in judgement and decision-making. Despite the impact this article has had on theory and practice, there have been no direct replications. In a pre-registered experiment (N = 623; Amazon MTurk on CloudResearch), we conducted a replication and extensions of nine problems from Kahneman and Tversky’s 1972 article. We successfully replicated eight out of the nine problems. We extended the replication by examining the consistency of heuristic responses across problems and by examining decision style as a predictor of participants’ use of the representativeness heuristic. Materials, data, and code are available on: https://osf.io/nhqc4/</p>