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Article: Revisiting and Rethinking the Identifiable Victim Effect: Replication and Extension of Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007)

TitleRevisiting and Rethinking the Identifiable Victim Effect: Replication and Extension of Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007)
Authors
Keywordsaffective heuristics
bias
deliberative thinking
identifiable victim effect
judgment and decision making
publication bias
robust Bayesian meta-analysis
Issue Date12-Jan-2024
PublisherUniversity of California Press
Citation
Collabra: Psychology, 2024, v. 9, n. 1 How to Cite?
Abstract

The identifiable victim effect describes the stronger tendency to help a specific victim than to help a group of unidentified statistical victims. Our reanalysis of a meta-analysis on the effect by Lee and Freely (2016) using robust Bayesian meta-analysis suggested publication bias in the literature and the need to revisit the phenomenon. We conducted a pre-registered far replication and extension of Studies 1 and 3 in Small et al. (2007), a seminal demonstration of the identifiable victim effect, with hypothetical donations. We examined the impact of deliberative thinking on the identifiable victim effect both by directly informing participants of the effect (Study 1) and by providing an identified victim with statistical information (Study 3). We found no empirical support for the identifiable victim effect (= .000, 95% CI [.000, .003]) and subsequently no support for debiasing such a phenomenon (= .001, 95% CI[.000, .012]). These findings suggest that the identifiable victim may be better framed in terms of ‘scope-insensitivity’. In other words, rather than providing more to a single identified victim, participants seem to be insensitive to the number of victims affected. However, our study involved only hypothetical donations rather than a real-effort real-donation paradigm as in Small et al. (2007). Therefore, we hope that our results spark motivation for future high-powered replications with real money donations, ideally carried out as registered reports and in collaboration with proponents of the original effect.


Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/348385
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 3.1
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.182
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMaier, Maximilian-
dc.contributor.authorWong, Yik Chun-
dc.contributor.authorFeldman, Gilad-
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-09T00:31:10Z-
dc.date.available2024-10-09T00:31:10Z-
dc.date.issued2024-01-12-
dc.identifier.citationCollabra: Psychology, 2024, v. 9, n. 1-
dc.identifier.issn2474-7394-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/348385-
dc.description.abstract<p>The identifiable victim effect describes the stronger tendency to help a specific victim than to help a group of unidentified statistical victims. Our reanalysis of a meta-analysis on the effect by Lee and Freely (2016) using robust Bayesian meta-analysis suggested publication bias in the literature and the need to revisit the phenomenon. We conducted a pre-registered far replication and extension of Studies 1 and 3 in Small et al. (2007), a seminal demonstration of the identifiable victim effect, with hypothetical donations. We examined the impact of deliberative thinking on the identifiable victim effect both by directly informing participants of the effect (Study 1) and by providing an identified victim with statistical information (Study 3). We found no empirical support for the identifiable victim effect (= .000, 95% CI [.000, .003]) and subsequently no support for debiasing such a phenomenon (= .001, 95% CI[.000, .012]). These findings suggest that the identifiable victim may be better framed in terms of ‘scope-insensitivity’. In other words, rather than providing more to a single identified victim, participants seem to be insensitive to the number of victims affected. However, our study involved only hypothetical donations rather than a real-effort real-donation paradigm as in Small et al. (2007). Therefore, we hope that our results spark motivation for future high-powered replications with real money donations, ideally carried out as registered reports and in collaboration with proponents of the original effect.</p>-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherUniversity of California Press-
dc.relation.ispartofCollabra: Psychology-
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.-
dc.subjectaffective heuristics-
dc.subjectbias-
dc.subjectdeliberative thinking-
dc.subjectidentifiable victim effect-
dc.subjectjudgment and decision making-
dc.subjectpublication bias-
dc.subjectrobust Bayesian meta-analysis-
dc.titleRevisiting and Rethinking the Identifiable Victim Effect: Replication and Extension of Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007)-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.doi10.1525/collabra.90203-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85184042244-
dc.identifier.volume9-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.eissn2474-7394-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:001181991500001-
dc.identifier.issnl2474-7394-

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