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- Publisher Website: 10.1007/s00148-015-0542-3
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84938422342
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Article: Strategic parenting, birth order, and school performance
Title | Strategic parenting, birth order, and school performance |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Birth order Grades Parental rules Parenting School performance |
Issue Date | 2015 |
Citation | Journal of Population Economics, 2015, v. 28, n. 4, p. 911-936 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Fueled by new evidence, there has been renewed interest about the effects of birth order on human capital accumulation. The underlying causal mechanisms for such effects remain unsettled. We consider a model in which parents impose more stringent disciplinary environments in response to their earlier-born children’s poor performance in school in order to deter such outcomes for their later-born offspring. We provide robust empirical evidence that school performance of children in the National Longitudinal Study Children (NLSY-C) declines with birth order as does the stringency of their parents’ disciplinary restrictions. When asked how they will respond if a child brought home bad grades, parents state that they would be less likely to punish their later-born children. Taken together, these patterns are consistent with a reputation model of strategic parenting. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/346603 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 3.3 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.688 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Hotz, V. Joseph | - |
dc.contributor.author | Pantano, Juan | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-09-17T04:11:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-09-17T04:11:59Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Population Economics, 2015, v. 28, n. 4, p. 911-936 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0933-1433 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/346603 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Fueled by new evidence, there has been renewed interest about the effects of birth order on human capital accumulation. The underlying causal mechanisms for such effects remain unsettled. We consider a model in which parents impose more stringent disciplinary environments in response to their earlier-born children’s poor performance in school in order to deter such outcomes for their later-born offspring. We provide robust empirical evidence that school performance of children in the National Longitudinal Study Children (NLSY-C) declines with birth order as does the stringency of their parents’ disciplinary restrictions. When asked how they will respond if a child brought home bad grades, parents state that they would be less likely to punish their later-born children. Taken together, these patterns are consistent with a reputation model of strategic parenting. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Population Economics | - |
dc.subject | Birth order | - |
dc.subject | Grades | - |
dc.subject | Parental rules | - |
dc.subject | Parenting | - |
dc.subject | School performance | - |
dc.title | Strategic parenting, birth order, and school performance | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00148-015-0542-3 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84938422342 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 28 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 911 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 936 | - |