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Article: Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity
Title | Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 26-Aug-2024 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, v. 147, p. 449-459 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We introduce behavioral diversity to an otherwise standard signaling model, in which a fraction of agents choose their signaling actions according to an exogenous distribution. These behavioral agents provide opportunities for strategic low-type agents to successfully emulate higher types in equilibrium, which in turn reduces the cost for strategic high-type agents to separate from lower types. Behavioral diversity thus improves the equilibrium payoffs to all types of strategic agents. The model also exhibits a convergence property, which is intuitively more appealing than the least-cost separating equilibrium of the standard setting. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/345956 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.522 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ishida, Junichiro | - |
dc.contributor.author | Suen, Wing | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-09-04T07:06:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-09-04T07:06:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2024-08-26 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, v. 147, p. 449-459 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/345956 | - |
dc.description.abstract | <p>We introduce behavioral diversity to an otherwise standard signaling model, in which a fraction of agents choose their signaling actions according to an exogenous distribution. These behavioral agents provide opportunities for strategic low-type agents to successfully emulate higher types in equilibrium, which in turn reduces the cost for strategic high-type agents to separate from lower types. Behavioral diversity thus improves the equilibrium payoffs to all types of strategic agents. The model also exhibits a convergence property, which is intuitively more appealing than the least-cost separating equilibrium of the standard setting.<br></p> | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | - |
dc.title | Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.008 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 147 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 449 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 459 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1090-2473 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0899-8256 | - |