File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1177/1465116511410087
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-80053594420
- Find via
Supplementary
-
Citations:
- Scopus: 0
- Appears in Collections:
Article: The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs' impact on decision outcomes in the European Union
Title | The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs' impact on decision outcomes in the European Union |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | bicameralism Council of Ministers European Parliament legislative bargaining rapporteurs |
Issue Date | 2011 |
Citation | European Union Politics, 2011, v. 12, n. 3, p. 337-357 How to Cite? |
Abstract | When the chambers of a bicameral legislature must negotiate to reach a decision outcome, the bargaining strength of each side is affected by the composition of its negotiating delegations. We examine some of the implications of this proposition for legislative negotiations between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers. We develop and test hypotheses on how the bargaining success of the EP is affected by the choice of its chief negotiator, the rapporteur. Our findings support the argument that negotiators in a bicameral setting play a 'two-level game', where bargaining strength is shaped by the degree to which negotiators can credibly claim to be constrained by their parent chamber. © The Author(s) 2011. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/345194 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.383 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Costello, Rory | - |
dc.contributor.author | Thomson, Robert | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-15T09:25:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-08-15T09:25:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | European Union Politics, 2011, v. 12, n. 3, p. 337-357 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1465-1165 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/345194 | - |
dc.description.abstract | When the chambers of a bicameral legislature must negotiate to reach a decision outcome, the bargaining strength of each side is affected by the composition of its negotiating delegations. We examine some of the implications of this proposition for legislative negotiations between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers. We develop and test hypotheses on how the bargaining success of the EP is affected by the choice of its chief negotiator, the rapporteur. Our findings support the argument that negotiators in a bicameral setting play a 'two-level game', where bargaining strength is shaped by the degree to which negotiators can credibly claim to be constrained by their parent chamber. © The Author(s) 2011. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | European Union Politics | - |
dc.subject | bicameralism | - |
dc.subject | Council of Ministers | - |
dc.subject | European Parliament | - |
dc.subject | legislative bargaining | - |
dc.subject | rapporteurs | - |
dc.title | The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs' impact on decision outcomes in the European Union | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1177/1465116511410087 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-80053594420 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 12 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 337 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 357 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1741-2757 | - |