A comparison of two views on the European Commission: engine of integration and conduit of national interests

Abstract

The conventional view of the Commission is that it is above the fray of national politics, and that Commissioners have allegiance to pan-European interests. However, research indicates that the Commission is in many ways imbued with national interests, despite being the engine of integration. This study examines the national Commissioner dividend, which is the tendency for the Commission’s policies on any given issue to agree more with the policy positions of the primarily responsible Commissioner’s home state than with other positions. We examine the conditions under which this national Commissioner dividend may be larger, including Commissioners’ partisanship and personal characteristics. The findings provide clear evidence of a national Commissioner dividend, notwithstanding the Commission’s general pro-integration and pan-European preferences. Moreover, the Commissioner dividend occurs in a broad range of circumstances. The study considers the implications of the findings for the Commission’s role in transmuting national interests into European-level policies.