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Article: Testing models of legislative decision-making with measurement error: The robust predictive power of bargaining models over procedural models
Title | Testing models of legislative decision-making with measurement error: The robust predictive power of bargaining models over procedural models |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Bargaining models legislative decision-making measurement error procedural models |
Issue Date | 2014 |
Citation | European Union Politics, 2014, v. 15, n. 1, p. 43-58 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Previous studies found that models emphasising legislative procedures make less accurate predictions of decision outcomes in the EU than the compromise model, a computationally simple variant of the Nash Bargaining Solution. In this journal, Slapin (2014) argues that this and other findings may be the result of measurement error. While acknowledging the importance of measurement error, we disagree with several assumptions in Slapin's analysis, and show that his results are driven by an unrealistic assumption about how policy preferences are distributed among EU decision makers. We construct simulated data that more accurately reflect the distributions of policy preferences found in existing empirical evidence and suggested by theory, and demonstrate that measurement error is unlikely to have biased previous findings. If real-world decision-making took place according to the procedural model, then it would have made the most accurate predictions, even with data containing large amounts of measurement error. While this strengthens our confidence in previous studies' findings, we explain why we should not discard procedural models. © The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/345058 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.383 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Leinaweaver, Justin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Thomson, Robert | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-15T09:24:56Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-08-15T09:24:56Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | European Union Politics, 2014, v. 15, n. 1, p. 43-58 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1465-1165 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/345058 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Previous studies found that models emphasising legislative procedures make less accurate predictions of decision outcomes in the EU than the compromise model, a computationally simple variant of the Nash Bargaining Solution. In this journal, Slapin (2014) argues that this and other findings may be the result of measurement error. While acknowledging the importance of measurement error, we disagree with several assumptions in Slapin's analysis, and show that his results are driven by an unrealistic assumption about how policy preferences are distributed among EU decision makers. We construct simulated data that more accurately reflect the distributions of policy preferences found in existing empirical evidence and suggested by theory, and demonstrate that measurement error is unlikely to have biased previous findings. If real-world decision-making took place according to the procedural model, then it would have made the most accurate predictions, even with data containing large amounts of measurement error. While this strengthens our confidence in previous studies' findings, we explain why we should not discard procedural models. © The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | European Union Politics | - |
dc.subject | Bargaining models | - |
dc.subject | legislative decision-making | - |
dc.subject | measurement error | - |
dc.subject | procedural models | - |
dc.title | Testing models of legislative decision-making with measurement error: The robust predictive power of bargaining models over procedural models | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1177/1465116513501908 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84885356222 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 15 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 43 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 58 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1741-2757 | - |