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Article: Judge Ideology and Opportunistic Insider Trading

TitleJudge Ideology and Opportunistic Insider Trading
Authors
Issue Date29-Feb-2024
PublisherCambridge University Press
Citation
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2024 How to Cite?
Abstract

Although federal judges are the ultimate arbiters of insider trading enforcement, the role of their political ideology in insider trading is unclear. Using the partisanship of judges’ nominating presidents to measure judge ideology, we first document that liberal judges are associated with heavier penalties in insider trading lawsuits than conservative judges. Next, we find that firms located in circuits with more liberal judges have fewer opportunistic insider sales. Cross-sectional analyses show that this deterrent effect is stronger when managers face a higher risk of insider trading lawsuits. Finally, we find that the SEC considers judges’ ideology when selecting litigation forums.


Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/341681
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 3.7
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.980

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Allen H-
dc.contributor.authorHui, Kai Wai-
dc.contributor.authorZheng, Yue-
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-20T06:58:15Z-
dc.date.available2024-03-20T06:58:15Z-
dc.date.issued2024-02-29-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2024-
dc.identifier.issn0022-1090-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/341681-
dc.description.abstract<p>Although federal judges are the ultimate arbiters of insider trading enforcement, the role of their political ideology in insider trading is unclear. Using the partisanship of judges’ nominating presidents to measure judge ideology, we first document that liberal judges are associated with heavier penalties in insider trading lawsuits than conservative judges. Next, we find that firms located in circuits with more liberal judges have fewer opportunistic insider sales. Cross-sectional analyses show that this deterrent effect is stronger when managers face a higher risk of insider trading lawsuits. Finally, we find that the SEC considers judges’ ideology when selecting litigation forums.<br></p>-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherCambridge University Press-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis-
dc.titleJudge Ideology and Opportunistic Insider Trading-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0022109024000164-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85186933501-
dc.identifier.eissn1756-6916-
dc.identifier.issnl0022-1090-

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