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Book Chapter: "Getting It Oneself" (Zide 自得) as an Alternative to Testimonial Knowledge and Deference to Tradition

Title"Getting It Oneself" (Zide 自得) as an Alternative to Testimonial Knowledge and Deference to Tradition
Authors
Issue Date1-Dec-2022
PublisherOxford University Press
Abstract

Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial journal offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading epistemologists in North America, Europe, and Australasia, the journal publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: (a) traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of skepticism, the nature of the a priori etc.; (b) new developments in epistemology, including movements (such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, and comparative epistemology) and approaches (such as contextualism); (c) foundational questions in decision-theory; (d) confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; (e) topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; (f) topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and (g) work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony, the ethics of belief, etc. Topics addressed in volume 7 include attention, epistemic virtue, Nyāya epistemology, knowledge-action principles, epistemic justice, trust, knowledge-first epistemology, transparency, self-knowledge, and moral epistemology. Papers make use of a variety of different tools and insights, including those of formal epistemology and decision theory, as well as traditional philosophical analysis and argumentation.


Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/341636
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorTiwald, Justin-
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-20T06:57:55Z-
dc.date.available2024-03-20T06:57:55Z-
dc.date.issued2022-12-01-
dc.identifier.isbn9780192868978-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/341636-
dc.description.abstract<p> Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial journal offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading epistemologists in North America, Europe, and Australasia, the journal publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: (a) traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of skepticism, the nature of the a priori etc.; (b) new developments in epistemology, including movements (such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, and comparative epistemology) and approaches (such as contextualism); (c) foundational questions in decision-theory; (d) confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; (e) topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; (f) topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and (g) work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony, the ethics of belief, etc. Topics addressed in volume 7 include attention, epistemic virtue, Nyāya epistemology, knowledge-action principles, epistemic justice, trust, knowledge-first epistemology, transparency, self-knowledge, and moral epistemology. Papers make use of a variety of different tools and insights, including those of formal epistemology and decision theory, as well as traditional philosophical analysis and argumentation. <br></p>-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press-
dc.relation.ispartofOxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7-
dc.title"Getting It Oneself" (Zide 自得) as an Alternative to Testimonial Knowledge and Deference to Tradition-
dc.typeBook_Chapter-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oso/9780192868978.003.0011-
dc.identifier.spage306-
dc.identifier.epage335-
dc.identifier.eisbn9780191965036-

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