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Conference Paper: Tracing the Evolution of Buddhist and Nyāya Views on Non-Conceptual Perception
Title | Tracing the Evolution of Buddhist and Nyāya Views on Non-Conceptual Perception |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 16-Dec-2021 |
Abstract | This paper seeks to explain one of the few points on which Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers actually came to an agreement -- namely, that non-conceptual perceptions (nirvikalpakapratyakṣa) are states of awareness which do not involve any attribution of names or predicative properties to objects ("nāmajātyādiyojanārahita"). I trace the evolution of Buddhist and Nyāya views on nirvikalpaka- pratyakṣa, and claim that there is a common trend in their development from Vasubandhu to Dignāga, and from Vātsyāyana to Vācaspati Miśra and Gaṅgeśa. That trend, I suggest, can be illuminated with a distinction made in contemporary discussions of non-conceptual content between "state non-conceptualism" and "content non-conceptualism." On my reading, both Buddhist and Nyāya thinkers ultimately shifted from presuming state non-conceptualism to advocating forms of content non-conceptualism. To explain this shift, I cite two philosophical and exegetical reasons. First, contemporary defenders of non-conceptualism have argued that the state view is ultimately untenable, and collapses into a content view. Second, Buddhists and Naiyāyikas came to view concept-possession as grounded upon the operation of memory-traces (saṃskāra), rather than on linguistic mastery. With this refined theory of concept- possession, the line between non-conceptual and concept-laden states was preservable only through positing an essential difference between non-conceptual and conceptual contents. Finally, I examine how, even having reached a shared definition of nirvikalpaka perception, the different theoretical commitments of Navya Nyāya and Buddhism led to a divergence over the conscious character of non-conceptual states. This divergence motivates us to consider how the conceptual structure of perceptual contents may be linked with their availability to consciousness. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/337389 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chaturvedi, Amit | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-11T10:20:30Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-11T10:20:30Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-12-16 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/337389 | - |
dc.description.abstract | <p>This paper seeks to explain one of the few points on which Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers actually came to an agreement -- namely, that non-conceptual perceptions (nirvikalpakapratyakṣa) are states of awareness which do not involve any attribution of names or predicative properties to objects ("nāmajātyādiyojanārahita"). I trace the evolution of Buddhist and Nyāya views on nirvikalpaka- pratyakṣa, and claim that there is a common trend in their development from Vasubandhu to Dignāga, and from Vātsyāyana to Vācaspati Miśra and Gaṅgeśa. That trend, I suggest, can be illuminated with a distinction made in contemporary discussions of non-conceptual content between "state non-conceptualism" and "content non-conceptualism." On my reading, both Buddhist and Nyāya thinkers ultimately shifted from presuming state non-conceptualism to advocating forms of content non-conceptualism. To explain this shift, I cite two philosophical and exegetical reasons. First, contemporary defenders of non-conceptualism have argued that the state view is ultimately untenable, and collapses into a content view. Second, Buddhists and Naiyāyikas came to view concept-possession as grounded upon the operation of memory-traces (saṃskāra), rather than on linguistic mastery. With this refined theory of concept- possession, the line between non-conceptual and concept-laden states was preservable only through positing an essential difference between non-conceptual and conceptual contents. Finally, I examine how, even having reached a shared definition of nirvikalpaka perception, the different theoretical commitments of Navya Nyāya and Buddhism led to a divergence over the conscious character of non-conceptual states. This divergence motivates us to consider how the conceptual structure of perceptual contents may be linked with their availability to consciousness.</p> | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | 11th Coffee Break Conference (16/12/2021-17/12/2021, Vienna) | - |
dc.title | Tracing the Evolution of Buddhist and Nyāya Views on Non-Conceptual Perception | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |