International perspectives on the Sino-Indian border conflict, 1950-1970

Abstract

This thesis explores the evolution of the Sino-Indian border conflict from 1950 to 1970. The border conflict, which emerged at the crossroads of the end of empire and beginning of the Cold War, peaked in 1962 when China and India fought a brief but fierce war. During, before, and after the 1962 war, international political actors engaged with the Sino-Indian frontier to destabilize spheres of influence and bolster alliances. This contest signified a revival of the nineteenth-century Great Game, during which Britain and Russia competed for territory and influence in South and Central Asia. The main actors in the twentieth-century iteration of this contest were the newly-formed People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India, however, rather than European empires. The theater of operations encompassed not only the Sino-Indian border itself, but also flanking areas such as Tibet, the Himalayan kingdoms, and Burma. In addition to China and India, Britain and other Commonwealth nations such as Pakistan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as Taiwan (the Republic of China), the Soviet Union, and the United States viewed the border conflict as an opportunity to pursue their foreign policy goals, which included trade, security, and prestige. Various governments used covert, overt, military, and non-military means in attempting to bring their goals to fruition. Drawing on oral history interviews and newly available documents from thirty-one archives, the thesis argues that the mid-twentieth century Sino-Indian border conflict—not just the 1962 war—transformed conceptions of the frontier and how power was articulated in the region.