Themes in Wittgenstein's philosophical methods

Abstract

The Austro-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, a major figure in twentieth-century thought, has a distinctive thinking and writing style. The thesis aims to appreciate his way of doing philosophy through an investigation of two themes in his methodology, ordinary language procedures and ethics. The study looks into examples of treatments of philosophical problems from Wittgenstein himself, those influenced by him, such as Stanley Cavell and John McDowell and those who have affinity with him, such as J. L. Austin and St. Augustine.

The first chapter examines Cavell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s understanding of the issue of other minds, that is, how one person can know the mental states of another, by linking Cavell with Austin and McDowell. The chapter argues that the ordinary language method of observing what we say when, employed by Austin, Cavell and Wittgenstein, is part of a broader endeavour to achieve an understanding of human beings when we fall into philosophical problems. This conclusion calls for a re-evaluation of ordinary language philosophy, a mid-twentieth-century tradition long considered obsolete.

The second chapter compares Wittgenstein’s and Augustine’s accounts of teaching, especially their respective inquires into ostensive definition, the act of telling someone what something is by pointing to an instance of it. It is argued that the two thinkers are remarkably close in their recognition of the autonomy of the learner. This kinship, on the one hand, points to a new reading of Augustine’s early philosophy while on the other, indicates the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein’s writing.