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Article: A QUESTION-SENSITIVE THEORY OF INTENTION

TitleA QUESTION-SENSITIVE THEORY OF INTENTION
Authors
Beddor, BobGoldstein, Simon
Keywordsclosure
doctrine of double effect
intention
propositional attitudes
question-sensitivity
Issue Date2023
Citation
Philosophical Quarterly, 2023, v. 73, n. 2, p. 346-378 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac031
AbstractThis paper develops a question-sensitive theory of intention. We show that this theory explains some puzzling closure properties of intention. In particular, it can be used to explain why one is rationally required to intend the means to one’s ends, even though one is not rationally required to intend all the foreseen consequences of one’s intended actions. It also explains why rational intention is not always closed under logical implication, and why one can only intend outcomes that one believes to be under one’s control.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/336377
ISSN
0031-8094
2023 Impact Factor: 1.1
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.024
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000833552500001

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBeddor, Bob-
dc.contributor.authorGoldstein, Simon-
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-15T08:26:19Z-
dc.date.available2024-01-15T08:26:19Z-
dc.date.issued2023-
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophical Quarterly, 2023, v. 73, n. 2, p. 346-378-
dc.identifier.issn0031-8094-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/336377-
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a question-sensitive theory of intention. We show that this theory explains some puzzling closure properties of intention. In particular, it can be used to explain why one is rationally required to intend the means to one’s ends, even though one is not rationally required to intend all the foreseen consequences of one’s intended actions. It also explains why rational intention is not always closed under logical implication, and why one can only intend outcomes that one believes to be under one’s control.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Quarterly-
dc.subjectclosure-
dc.subjectdoctrine of double effect-
dc.subjectintention-
dc.subjectpropositional attitudes-
dc.subjectquestion-sensitivity-
dc.titleA QUESTION-SENSITIVE THEORY OF INTENTION-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/pq/pqac031-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85153476345-
dc.identifier.volume73-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage346-
dc.identifier.epage378-
dc.identifier.eissn1467-9213-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000833552500001-

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