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- Publisher Website: 10.1142/S0219198907001552
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-34948867727
- WOS: WOS:000216779300006
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Article: Two-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions
Title | Two-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Exposure problem Simultaneous auctions |
Issue Date | 2007 |
Citation | International Game Theory Review, 2007, v. 9, n. 3, p. 483-493 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the objects are either complements or substitutes. In both cases a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria are identified. All these equilibria have a surprising structure: The supports of all the mixtures that generate equilibria are two one-dimensional curves, and they surround a two-dimensional set of pure best responses. © World Scientific Publishing Company. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330095 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.200 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Szentes, Balázs | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T03:37:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-09T03:37:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Game Theory Review, 2007, v. 9, n. 3, p. 483-493 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0219-1989 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330095 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the objects are either complements or substitutes. In both cases a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria are identified. All these equilibria have a surprising structure: The supports of all the mixtures that generate equilibria are two one-dimensional curves, and they surround a two-dimensional set of pure best responses. © World Scientific Publishing Company. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Game Theory Review | - |
dc.subject | Exposure problem | - |
dc.subject | Simultaneous auctions | - |
dc.title | Two-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1142/S0219198907001552 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-34948867727 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 9 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 483 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 493 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000216779300006 | - |