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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00131-3
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-0242654878
- WOS: WOS:000186408200002
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Article: Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games
| Title | Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | Exposure problem Mixed strategy Simultaneous auction |
| Issue Date | 2003 |
| Citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, v. 45, n. 2, p. 278-295 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | Majority auction games are simultaneous sealed-bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction (more than a half) of the objects. Each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it. Symmetric equilibria having simple, intuitive forms are shown to exist in first-price, second-price and all-pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large. This contrasts with earlier results for the two-bidder "pure chopstick" majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330045 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.522 |
| ISI Accession Number ID |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Szentes, Balázs | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Rosenthal, Robert W. | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T03:37:24Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-08-09T03:37:24Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, v. 45, n. 2, p. 278-295 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330045 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Majority auction games are simultaneous sealed-bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction (more than a half) of the objects. Each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it. Symmetric equilibria having simple, intuitive forms are shown to exist in first-price, second-price and all-pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large. This contrasts with earlier results for the two-bidder "pure chopstick" majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | - |
| dc.subject | Exposure problem | - |
| dc.subject | Mixed strategy | - |
| dc.subject | Simultaneous auction | - |
| dc.title | Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00131-3 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0242654878 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 45 | - |
| dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 278 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 295 | - |
| dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000186408200002 | - |