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Article: Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra

TitleThree-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra
Authors
Szentes, BalázsRosenthal, Robert W.
KeywordsEquilibrium
Exposure problem
First-price
Second-price
Issue Date2003
Citation
Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, v. 44, n. 1, p. 114-133 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00530-4
AbstractSymmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in three simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the bidders' marginal valuations increase for the second object and then decrease for the third. In all cases the support of the mixture that generates the equilibrium is two-dimensional, and it surrounds a three-dimensional set of best responses. This appears to be a previously unknown structure. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/330043
ISSN
0899-8256
2023 Impact Factor: 1.0
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.522
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000183831600006

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSzentes, Balázs-
dc.contributor.authorRosenthal, Robert W.-
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-09T03:37:23Z-
dc.date.available2023-08-09T03:37:23Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.citationGames and Economic Behavior, 2003, v. 44, n. 1, p. 114-133-
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/330043-
dc.description.abstractSymmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in three simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the bidders' marginal valuations increase for the second object and then decrease for the third. In all cases the support of the mixture that generates the equilibrium is two-dimensional, and it surrounds a three-dimensional set of best responses. This appears to be a previously unknown structure. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavior-
dc.subjectEquilibrium-
dc.subjectExposure problem-
dc.subjectFirst-price-
dc.subjectSecond-price-
dc.titleThree-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00530-4-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0242516512-
dc.identifier.volume44-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage114-
dc.identifier.epage133-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000183831600006-

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