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Article: Information design in the holdup problem
Title | Information design in the holdup problem |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Citation | Journal of Political Economy, 2020, v. 128, n. 2, p. 681-709 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer’s distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1/e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer’s equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trade is ex post efficient. These properties are shown to be preserved even when different distributions are differentially costly as long as the cost is monotone in the dispersion of the distribution. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330010 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 6.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 18.530 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Condorelli, Daniele | - |
dc.contributor.author | Szentes, Balázs | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T03:37:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-09T03:37:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Political Economy, 2020, v. 128, n. 2, p. 681-709 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-3808 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/330010 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer’s distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1/e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer’s equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trade is ex post efficient. These properties are shown to be preserved even when different distributions are differentially costly as long as the cost is monotone in the dispersion of the distribution. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Political Economy | - |
dc.title | Information design in the holdup problem | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1086/704574 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85068044173 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 128 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 681 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 709 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1537-534X | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000511464700008 | - |