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- Publisher Website: 10.1093/restud/rdu025
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84928947476
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Article: Contractible contracts in common agency problems
Title | Contractible contracts in common agency problems |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Common agency Contractible contracts |
Issue Date | 2012 |
Citation | Review of Economic Studies, 2012, v. 82, n. 1, p. 391-422 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This article analyses contractual situations between many principals and many agents. The agents have private information, and the principals take actions. Principals have the ability to contract not only on the reports of the agents but also on the contracts offered by other principals. Contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. The main result of the article is a characterization of the allocations that can be implemented as equilibria in our contracting game. We then restrict attention to exclusivecontracting environments, in which the agent may select the contract of at most one principal. In this setting, our characterization result implies that principals can collude to implement the monopolist outcome. Finally, in general, equilibrium contracts turn out to be incomplete. That is, a contract will restrict the action space of a principal but will not necessarily determine a single action. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329999 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 13.609 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Szentes, Balázs | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T03:37:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-09T03:37:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Review of Economic Studies, 2012, v. 82, n. 1, p. 391-422 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0034-6527 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329999 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This article analyses contractual situations between many principals and many agents. The agents have private information, and the principals take actions. Principals have the ability to contract not only on the reports of the agents but also on the contracts offered by other principals. Contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. The main result of the article is a characterization of the allocations that can be implemented as equilibria in our contracting game. We then restrict attention to exclusivecontracting environments, in which the agent may select the contract of at most one principal. In this setting, our characterization result implies that principals can collude to implement the monopolist outcome. Finally, in general, equilibrium contracts turn out to be incomplete. That is, a contract will restrict the action space of a principal but will not necessarily determine a single action. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Review of Economic Studies | - |
dc.subject | Common agency | - |
dc.subject | Contractible contracts | - |
dc.title | Contractible contracts in common agency problems | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/restud/rdu025 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84928947476 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 82 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 391 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 422 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1467-937X | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000350114400012 | - |