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- Publisher Website: 10.1257/aer.20160145
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85026663261
- WOS: WOS:000404592200011
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Article: Buyer-optimal learning and monopoly pricing
Title | Buyer-optimal learning and monopoly pricing |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Citation | American Economic Review, 2017, v. 107, n. 7, p. 2072-2080 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payoff. We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates (i) effcient trade and (ii) a unitelastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other buyer-optimal signal structure yields the same outcome as the one we identify: in particular, the same price. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329836 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 10.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 22.344 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Roesler, Anne Katrin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Szentes, Balazs | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T03:35:41Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-09T03:35:41Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | American Economic Review, 2017, v. 107, n. 7, p. 2072-2080 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0002-8282 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/329836 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payoff. We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates (i) effcient trade and (ii) a unitelastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other buyer-optimal signal structure yields the same outcome as the one we identify: in particular, the same price. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | American Economic Review | - |
dc.title | Buyer-optimal learning and monopoly pricing | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/aer.20160145 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85026663261 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 107 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 7 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 2072 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 2080 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000404592200011 | - |