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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.01.002
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85041802718
- WOS: WOS:000428093000004
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Article: Law, social responsibility, and outsourcing
Title | Law, social responsibility, and outsourcing |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Corporate social responsibility Law Outsourcing Vertical integration |
Issue Date | 2018 |
Citation | International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018, v. 57, p. 114-146 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Previous research into law and corporate social responsibility mostly assumes that the vertical structure of production is exogenous. Here, we allow a brand to choose between vertical integration and outsourcing. With outsourcing, the brand avoids some liability and responsibility, but loses direct control over the producer's infringement of law or code of conduct. Infringement increases with production, so the brand tailors production to guide the producer's infringement. The elasticity of demand for the product affects the degree to which, under outsourcing, the brand will increase production to induce the producer to reduce cost through infringement. If the demand is sufficiently elastic relative to the social harm caused by infringement, the optimal policy is to reduce avoidance such that the brand chooses vertical integration. However, if the demand is sufficiently inelastic relative to the social harm, then the optimal policy is to increase avoidance such that the brand chooses outsourcing. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/326150 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.7 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.036 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Fu, Qiang | - |
dc.contributor.author | Gong, Jie | - |
dc.contributor.author | Png, I. P.L. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-09T09:58:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-03-09T09:58:23Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018, v. 57, p. 114-146 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-7187 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/326150 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Previous research into law and corporate social responsibility mostly assumes that the vertical structure of production is exogenous. Here, we allow a brand to choose between vertical integration and outsourcing. With outsourcing, the brand avoids some liability and responsibility, but loses direct control over the producer's infringement of law or code of conduct. Infringement increases with production, so the brand tailors production to guide the producer's infringement. The elasticity of demand for the product affects the degree to which, under outsourcing, the brand will increase production to induce the producer to reduce cost through infringement. If the demand is sufficiently elastic relative to the social harm caused by infringement, the optimal policy is to reduce avoidance such that the brand chooses vertical integration. However, if the demand is sufficiently inelastic relative to the social harm, then the optimal policy is to increase avoidance such that the brand chooses outsourcing. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Journal of Industrial Organization | - |
dc.subject | Corporate social responsibility | - |
dc.subject | Law | - |
dc.subject | Outsourcing | - |
dc.subject | Vertical integration | - |
dc.title | Law, social responsibility, and outsourcing | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.01.002 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85041802718 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 57 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 114 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 146 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000428093000004 | - |