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Article: Governance and Informal Economies: Informality, Uncertainty and Street Vending in China

TitleGovernance and Informal Economies: Informality, Uncertainty and Street Vending in China
Authors
Issue Date2021
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/
Citation
The British Journal of Criminology, 2021 How to Cite?
AbstractHow can people who work in the informal sector protect property rights and address uncertainties? Street vending forms an essential part of urban economies in developing countries like China, and most street vendors operate outside state regulation. They encounter market-based uncertainties and uncertainties caused by unpredictable enforcement. Empirical data collected in Guangzhou and Guilin suggests that street vendors form private governance organizations to solve resource limitations, allocate pitches and resist government interference. Street vendors who cannot rely on effective private governance organizations may purchase protection from a third party (e.g. agents of the state) to secure informal rights to a particular spot and avoid confiscation of their wares and equipment. This study contributes to existing literature on private governance and informality by empirically examining private governance institutions in an informal economy.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/317463
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorJiang, A-
dc.contributor.authorWang, P-
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-07T10:20:58Z-
dc.date.available2022-10-07T10:20:58Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citationThe British Journal of Criminology, 2021-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/317463-
dc.description.abstractHow can people who work in the informal sector protect property rights and address uncertainties? Street vending forms an essential part of urban economies in developing countries like China, and most street vendors operate outside state regulation. They encounter market-based uncertainties and uncertainties caused by unpredictable enforcement. Empirical data collected in Guangzhou and Guilin suggests that street vendors form private governance organizations to solve resource limitations, allocate pitches and resist government interference. Street vendors who cannot rely on effective private governance organizations may purchase protection from a third party (e.g. agents of the state) to secure informal rights to a particular spot and avoid confiscation of their wares and equipment. This study contributes to existing literature on private governance and informality by empirically examining private governance institutions in an informal economy.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/-
dc.relation.ispartofThe British Journal of Criminology-
dc.rightsPost-print: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in [insert journal title] following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [insert complete citation information here] is available online at: xxxxxxx [insert URL that the author will receive upon publication here]. -
dc.titleGovernance and Informal Economies: Informality, Uncertainty and Street Vending in China-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailWang, P: pengwang@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityWang, P=rp01936-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/bjc/azab112-
dc.identifier.hkuros337832-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000789360100001-

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