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Article: Untying Hands: De-escalation, Reputation, and Dynamic Audience Costs
Title | Untying Hands: De-escalation, Reputation, and Dynamic Audience Costs |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2022 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=JPS |
Citation | British Journal of Political Science, 2022, v. 52, p. 1964-1976 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Two states in a dispute refuse to back down. One ties its own hands to strengthen its stand and gain advantage; the other tries to untie the tied hands to preempt disadvantage. Tying hands is a well-studied strategy, but it tells only part of the story, and the response strategy of untying hands remains unexplored. Can a state untie the tied hands of its opponent to give freedom back to its opponent—the freedom to concede? I identify three strategies of untying hands: counterthreat, reassurance, and normative framing. I show experimentally that these strategies can reduce the public costs of backing down and the perceived reputational damage from backing down. Tied hands and audience costs are not static and immutable, but dynamic and malleable by the other side. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/317435 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Quek, CK | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-10-07T10:20:27Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-10-07T10:20:27Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | British Journal of Political Science, 2022, v. 52, p. 1964-1976 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/317435 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Two states in a dispute refuse to back down. One ties its own hands to strengthen its stand and gain advantage; the other tries to untie the tied hands to preempt disadvantage. Tying hands is a well-studied strategy, but it tells only part of the story, and the response strategy of untying hands remains unexplored. Can a state untie the tied hands of its opponent to give freedom back to its opponent—the freedom to concede? I identify three strategies of untying hands: counterthreat, reassurance, and normative framing. I show experimentally that these strategies can reduce the public costs of backing down and the perceived reputational damage from backing down. Tied hands and audience costs are not static and immutable, but dynamic and malleable by the other side. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=JPS | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | British Journal of Political Science | - |
dc.rights | British Journal of Political Science. Copyright © Cambridge University Press. | - |
dc.rights | This article has been published in a revised form in [Journal] [http://doi.org/XXX]. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder. | - |
dc.title | Untying Hands: De-escalation, Reputation, and Dynamic Audience Costs | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Quek, CK: quek@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Quek, CK=rp01797 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0007123421000466 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 338073 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 52 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1964 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1976 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000730455100001 | - |