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Conference Paper: Corporate Political Connections and Favorable Environmental Regulatory Enforcement
Title | Corporate Political Connections and Favorable Environmental Regulatory Enforcement |
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Authors | |
Advisors | |
Keywords | Political connections Elections Regulation |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Publisher | Chinese Association of Finance. |
Citation | China International Conference in Finance (CICF), Guangzhou, China, July 9-12, 2019 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We examine whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uniformly enforces the Clean Air Act for politically connected and unconnected firms using a close election setting. We find no difference in regulated pollutant emissions or EPA investigations between the two groups, although connected firms experience less regulatory enforcement and lower penalties. These results are more pronounced for firms connected to politicians capable of influencing regulatory bureaucrats and for connected firms that are more important to their supported politicians. Taken together, our results show that campaign contributions can indirectly benefit firms by way of reduced environmental regulatory enforcement and penalties. |
Description | Session: Government Regulations and Corporate Decision Making Founding organizer: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; co-organizers: Department of Accounting, School of Management, Jinan University, Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance (SAIF), Shanghai Jiao Tong University |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/316940 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | - | |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, Z | - |
dc.contributor.author | Heitz, A | - |
dc.contributor.author | WANG, Y | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-16T07:26:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-09-16T07:26:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | China International Conference in Finance (CICF), Guangzhou, China, July 9-12, 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/316940 | - |
dc.description | Session: Government Regulations and Corporate Decision Making | - |
dc.description | Founding organizer: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; co-organizers: Department of Accounting, School of Management, Jinan University, Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance (SAIF), Shanghai Jiao Tong University | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uniformly enforces the Clean Air Act for politically connected and unconnected firms using a close election setting. We find no difference in regulated pollutant emissions or EPA investigations between the two groups, although connected firms experience less regulatory enforcement and lower penalties. These results are more pronounced for firms connected to politicians capable of influencing regulatory bureaucrats and for connected firms that are more important to their supported politicians. Taken together, our results show that campaign contributions can indirectly benefit firms by way of reduced environmental regulatory enforcement and penalties. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Chinese Association of Finance. | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | China International Conference in Finance 2019, Guangzhou, China: Program notes and index of sessions | - |
dc.subject | Political connections | - |
dc.subject | Elections | - |
dc.subject | Regulation | - |
dc.title | Corporate Political Connections and Favorable Environmental Regulatory Enforcement | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.identifier.email | Wang, Z: wangzg@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Wang, Z=rp02039 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 336496 | - |
dc.publisher.place | China | - |