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- Publisher Website: 10.1109/TMC.2021.3052963
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85099724146
- WOS: WOS:000836627600023
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Article: Timeliness-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Vehicular Crowdsourcing in Smart Cities
Title | Timeliness-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Vehicular Crowdsourcing in Smart Cities |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | crowdsensing edge computing incentive mechanism reverse auction Vehicular crowdsourcing |
Issue Date | 2022 |
Citation | IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2022, v. 21, n. 9, p. 3373-3387 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Vehicular crowdsourcing is a promising paradigm that takes advantage of powerful onboard capabilities of vehicles to perform various tasks in smart cities. To fulfill this vision, a well-designed incentive mechanism is essential to stimulate the participation of vehicles. In this paper, we propose a timeliness-aware incentive mechanism for vehicular crowdsourcing by taking vehicle's uncertain travel time into account. In view of the stochastic nature of traffic conditions, we derive a tractable expression for the probability distribution of task delay based on a discrete-time traffic model. By leveraging reverse auction framework, we model the utility of a service requester as a function in terms of uncertain task delay and incurred payment. To maximize the requester's utility under a budget constraint, we cast the mechanism design as a non-monotone submodular maximization problem over a knapsack constraint. Based on this formulation, we develop a truthful budgeted utility maximization auction (TBUMA), which is truthful, budget feasible, profitable, individually rational and computationally efficient. Through extensive trace-based simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed incentive mechanism. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/316569 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 7.7 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.755 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chen, Xianhao | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Lan | - |
dc.contributor.author | Pang, Yawei | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lin, Bin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Fang, Yuguang | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-14T11:40:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-09-14T11:40:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2022, v. 21, n. 9, p. 3373-3387 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1536-1233 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/316569 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Vehicular crowdsourcing is a promising paradigm that takes advantage of powerful onboard capabilities of vehicles to perform various tasks in smart cities. To fulfill this vision, a well-designed incentive mechanism is essential to stimulate the participation of vehicles. In this paper, we propose a timeliness-aware incentive mechanism for vehicular crowdsourcing by taking vehicle's uncertain travel time into account. In view of the stochastic nature of traffic conditions, we derive a tractable expression for the probability distribution of task delay based on a discrete-time traffic model. By leveraging reverse auction framework, we model the utility of a service requester as a function in terms of uncertain task delay and incurred payment. To maximize the requester's utility under a budget constraint, we cast the mechanism design as a non-monotone submodular maximization problem over a knapsack constraint. Based on this formulation, we develop a truthful budgeted utility maximization auction (TBUMA), which is truthful, budget feasible, profitable, individually rational and computationally efficient. Through extensive trace-based simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed incentive mechanism. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing | - |
dc.subject | crowdsensing | - |
dc.subject | edge computing | - |
dc.subject | incentive mechanism | - |
dc.subject | reverse auction | - |
dc.subject | Vehicular crowdsourcing | - |
dc.title | Timeliness-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Vehicular Crowdsourcing in Smart Cities | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/TMC.2021.3052963 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85099724146 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 21 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 9 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 3373 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 3387 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1558-0660 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000836627600023 | - |