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- Publisher Website: 10.1080/09638180.2014.990477
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84916886533
- WOS: WOS:000373822300002
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Article: The Effect of Board Independence on Information Asymmetry
Title | The Effect of Board Independence on Information Asymmetry |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2016 |
Citation | European Accounting Review, 2016, v. 25, n. 1, p. 155-182 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Boards have an important role in ensuring that investors’ interests are protected. Our paper first examines whether the independence of a firm's board affects information asymmetry among investors. We provide evidence that greater board independence leads to lower information asymmetry. Next, we provide evidence that more voluntary disclosure and greater analyst coverage are two underlying mechanisms via which greater board independence reduces information asymmetry. Of the two mechanisms, we find that analyst coverage is more significant in influencing how board independence affects information asymmetry. Overall, our paper contributes to a better understanding of the effect of board independence on information asymmetry. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/315247 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.264 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Goh, Beng Wee | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Jimmy | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ng, Jeffrey | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ow Yong, Kevin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-08-05T10:18:11Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-08-05T10:18:11Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | European Accounting Review, 2016, v. 25, n. 1, p. 155-182 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0963-8180 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/315247 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Boards have an important role in ensuring that investors’ interests are protected. Our paper first examines whether the independence of a firm's board affects information asymmetry among investors. We provide evidence that greater board independence leads to lower information asymmetry. Next, we provide evidence that more voluntary disclosure and greater analyst coverage are two underlying mechanisms via which greater board independence reduces information asymmetry. Of the two mechanisms, we find that analyst coverage is more significant in influencing how board independence affects information asymmetry. Overall, our paper contributes to a better understanding of the effect of board independence on information asymmetry. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | European Accounting Review | - |
dc.title | The Effect of Board Independence on Information Asymmetry | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/09638180.2014.990477 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84916886533 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 25 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 155 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 182 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1468-4497 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000373822300002 | - |