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Conference Paper: Mutual funds' strategic voting on environmental and social issues

TitleMutual funds' strategic voting on environmental and social issues
Authors
KeywordsResponsible investment
Strategic voting
Mutual funds
Fiduciary duty
Issue Date2022
PublisherEuropean Corporate Governance Institute.
Citation
ECGI Corporate Governance Conference, Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 7-8, 2022 How to Cite?
AbstractEnvironmental and social (ES) funds in non-ES families must balance incorporating the stakeholder’s interests they advertise and maximizing shareholder value favored by their families. We find that these funds support ES proposals that are far from the majority threshold, while opposing them when their vote is more likely to be pivotal, consistent with greenwashing. This strategic voting is not exhibited in governance proposals, by ES funds in ES families or by non-ES funds in non-ES families, reinforcing the notion of strategic voting to accommodate family preferences while appearing to meet the fiduciaries responsibilities of the funds.
DescriptionPrevious title: ES Votes that Matter
European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 774/2021
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/314925
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMichaely, R-
dc.contributor.authorOrdonez-Calafi, G-
dc.contributor.authorRubio, S-
dc.date.accessioned2022-08-05T09:37:04Z-
dc.date.available2022-08-05T09:37:04Z-
dc.date.issued2022-
dc.identifier.citationECGI Corporate Governance Conference, Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 7-8, 2022-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/314925-
dc.descriptionPrevious title: ES Votes that Matter-
dc.descriptionEuropean Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 774/2021-
dc.description.abstractEnvironmental and social (ES) funds in non-ES families must balance incorporating the stakeholder’s interests they advertise and maximizing shareholder value favored by their families. We find that these funds support ES proposals that are far from the majority threshold, while opposing them when their vote is more likely to be pivotal, consistent with greenwashing. This strategic voting is not exhibited in governance proposals, by ES funds in ES families or by non-ES funds in non-ES families, reinforcing the notion of strategic voting to accommodate family preferences while appearing to meet the fiduciaries responsibilities of the funds.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherEuropean Corporate Governance Institute.-
dc.relation.ispartofECGI Corporate Governance Conference, Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 7-8, 2022-
dc.subjectResponsible investment-
dc.subjectStrategic voting-
dc.subjectMutual funds-
dc.subjectFiduciary duty-
dc.titleMutual funds' strategic voting on environmental and social issues-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailMichaely, R: ronim@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.3884917-
dc.identifier.hkuros334909-
dc.publisher.placeIsrael-
dc.identifier.ssrn3884917-

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