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Conference Paper: On Retweeting

TitleOn Retweeting
Authors
Issue Date2021
Citation
Glasgow University Philosophy Society Online Meeting, Glasgow, UK, 23 November 2021 How to Cite?
AbstractA small but growing literature in philosophy is devoted to the understanding of a seemingly new communicative action that came with the internet, and with Twitter in particular: the retweet. The spur for this literature is a kind of puzzle in public discourse: on the one hand, there is a tendency to hold people responsible for their retweets, and to blame them for retweeting material considered offensive or otherwise inappropriate. On the other hand, there is a widely shared, if not universally-recognized feeling that, as the well-known disclaimer has it, "A retweet is not an endorsement." But if a retweet is not an endorsement, what is it? And what is wrong with retweeting offensive or misleading tweets? What sort of responsibility do people have for their retweets? Here, we put forward the view that bare, uncommented retweets are best understood along the lines of bare locutionary acts---figuring into various forms of illocution, but being more basic than any of those and, thereby, not directly the appropriate subject of norms. If this is right, the questions we then need to ask are: is this an acceptable way for things to be in the age of social media, in terms of its effects on our collective epistemic environment? If not, then (i) what should we want retweeting to be like and (ii) how can we plausibly nudge things in that direction?
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/312130

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSterken, RKen_HK
dc.contributor.authorPepp, Jen_HK
dc.contributor.authorMichaelson, Een_HK
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-20T03:14:29Z-
dc.date.available2022-04-20T03:14:29Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citationGlasgow University Philosophy Society Online Meeting, Glasgow, UK, 23 November 2021en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/312130-
dc.description.abstractA small but growing literature in philosophy is devoted to the understanding of a seemingly new communicative action that came with the internet, and with Twitter in particular: the retweet. The spur for this literature is a kind of puzzle in public discourse: on the one hand, there is a tendency to hold people responsible for their retweets, and to blame them for retweeting material considered offensive or otherwise inappropriate. On the other hand, there is a widely shared, if not universally-recognized feeling that, as the well-known disclaimer has it, "A retweet is not an endorsement." But if a retweet is not an endorsement, what is it? And what is wrong with retweeting offensive or misleading tweets? What sort of responsibility do people have for their retweets? Here, we put forward the view that bare, uncommented retweets are best understood along the lines of bare locutionary acts---figuring into various forms of illocution, but being more basic than any of those and, thereby, not directly the appropriate subject of norms. If this is right, the questions we then need to ask are: is this an acceptable way for things to be in the age of social media, in terms of its effects on our collective epistemic environment? If not, then (i) what should we want retweeting to be like and (ii) how can we plausibly nudge things in that direction?en_HK
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofGlasgow University Philosophy Society Meeting-
dc.titleOn Retweetingen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailSterken, RK: sterkenr@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authoritySterken, RK=rp02715-
dc.identifier.hkuros329142-

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