Ecumenical Truthmaking: A Précis of A Theory of Truthmaking

Abstract

The theory of truthmaking has long aroused skepticism from philosophers who believe it to be tangled up in contentious ontological commitments and unnecessary theoretical baggage. I argue in A Theory of Truthmaking that this suspicion is unfounded. Philosophers across the spectrum can take advantage of truthmaking and use it to better understand the ontological implications of topics that arise all over the philosophical landscape. Challenging the current orthodoxy that truthmaking’s fundamental purpose is to be a tool for explaining why truths are true, the book revives the conception of truthmaking as fundamentally an exercise in ontology: a means for coordinating one’s beliefs about what is true and one’s ontological commitments. I go on to show how truthmaking connects to analyticity, truth, and realism and how it contributes to debates over nominalism, presentism, mathematical objects, and fictional characters.