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- Publisher Website: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4132
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85124311535
- WOS: WOS:000748418200017
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Article: Good to Go First? Position Effects in Expert Evaluation of Early-Stage Ventures
Title | Good to Go First? Position Effects in Expert Evaluation of Early-Stage Ventures |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2021 |
Citation | Management Science, 2021, Forthcoming How to Cite? |
Abstract | There is often considerable anxiety and conflicting advice concerning the benefits of presenting/being evaluated first. We thus investigate how expert evaluators vary in their evaluations of entrepreneurial proposals based upon the order in which they are evaluated. Our research setting is a premiere innovation fund competition in Beijing, China, where the prize money at stake is economically meaningful, and evaluators are quasi-randomly assigned to evaluate written grant proposals without the possibility of peer influence. This enables us to credibly recover a causal position effect. We also theorize and test how heterogeneity in evaluators’ prior (context-specific) judging experience moderates position effects. Overall, we find that a proposal evaluated first requires total assets in the top 10th percentile to merely equal the evaluation of a proposal in the bottom 10th percentile that is not evaluated first. Firm and evaluator fixed-effects models yield consistent findings. We consider evaluation design elements that may mollify these position effects in the discussion section. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/307809 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Bian, J | - |
dc.contributor.author | Greenberg, J | - |
dc.contributor.author | Li, J | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, Y | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-12T13:38:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-12T13:38:13Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Management Science, 2021, Forthcoming | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/307809 | - |
dc.description.abstract | There is often considerable anxiety and conflicting advice concerning the benefits of presenting/being evaluated first. We thus investigate how expert evaluators vary in their evaluations of entrepreneurial proposals based upon the order in which they are evaluated. Our research setting is a premiere innovation fund competition in Beijing, China, where the prize money at stake is economically meaningful, and evaluators are quasi-randomly assigned to evaluate written grant proposals without the possibility of peer influence. This enables us to credibly recover a causal position effect. We also theorize and test how heterogeneity in evaluators’ prior (context-specific) judging experience moderates position effects. Overall, we find that a proposal evaluated first requires total assets in the top 10th percentile to merely equal the evaluation of a proposal in the bottom 10th percentile that is not evaluated first. Firm and evaluator fixed-effects models yield consistent findings. We consider evaluation design elements that may mollify these position effects in the discussion section. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Management Science | - |
dc.title | Good to Go First? Position Effects in Expert Evaluation of Early-Stage Ventures | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Bian, J: bian@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.email | Wang, Y: wyanbo@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Bian, J=rp02851 | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Wang, Y=rp02833 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4132 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85124311535 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 330382 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | Forthcoming | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000748418200017 | - |