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Article: Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms
Title | Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2021 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://titles.cambridge.org/journals/journal_catalogue.asp?mnemonic=psr |
Citation | American Political Science Review, 2021, v. 115 n. 2, p. 537-549 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Two mechanisms of costly signaling are known in international relations: sinking costs and tying hands. I show that there exist four mechanisms of costly signaling that are equally general. I develop the new mechanisms of installment costs and reducible costs and contrast them with sunk costs and tied-hands costs. I then conduct experiments to test the four signaling mechanisms. I find that each mechanism can improve credibility when the costs are high, but reducible costs can improve credibility even when the costs are low. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/304282 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 5.070 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Quek, K | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-23T08:57:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-23T08:57:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | American Political Science Review, 2021, v. 115 n. 2, p. 537-549 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0003-0554 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/304282 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Two mechanisms of costly signaling are known in international relations: sinking costs and tying hands. I show that there exist four mechanisms of costly signaling that are equally general. I develop the new mechanisms of installment costs and reducible costs and contrast them with sunk costs and tied-hands costs. I then conduct experiments to test the four signaling mechanisms. I find that each mechanism can improve credibility when the costs are high, but reducible costs can improve credibility even when the costs are low. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://titles.cambridge.org/journals/journal_catalogue.asp?mnemonic=psr | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | American Political Science Review | - |
dc.rights | American Political Science Review. Copyright © Cambridge University Press. | - |
dc.rights | This article has been published in a revised form in [Journal] [http://doi.org/XXX]. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder. | - |
dc.title | Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Quek, K: quek@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Quek, K=rp01797 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0003055420001094 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85099584466 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 325248 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 115 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 537 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 549 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000635247900013 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |