The concept of the human being in Aristotle's natural and political philosophy

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on a number of issues related to Aristotle’s conceptualization of the “human being” (ἄνθρωπος). Aristotle’s concept of the human being has long been considered as an unambiguous and consistent concept: there is no concept of the human being beyond the one single concept of the human being, for the human being is an ultimate species (ἔσχατον εἶδος) that admits of no differentiation (PA 1.4.644a23-33; HA 1.6.490b16-19; Cf. Metaph. Γ.3.999a5-6). Yet on some occasions, Aristotle seems to distinguish among human beings. He implies that some groups of human beings (e.g. human males) are more fully human than some other groups of human beings (e.g. human females or natural slaves). Why, then, does he claim that no human being qua human being is more or less a human being than another in the Categories? Why does he claim that a human female does not differ from a human male in humanity (Metaph. 1058a29-32)? And why can natural slaves, in his view, be enslaved in the same way as tame or domesticated animals (Pol. 1254b20-26)? I attend to these questions by exploring Aristotle’s conceptualization of the human being in his natural and political philosophy. In the first chapter, I defend both the divisibility and the indivisibility of human εἶδος in Aristotle. I argue that Aristotle has distinguished between two kinds of human εἶδος: the human εἶδος as first actuality (human εἶδοςA1) and the human εἶδος as second actuality (human εἶδοςA2). Human εἶδος in the sense of human εἶδοςA1 is indivisible for Aristotle, but in the sense of human εἶδοςA2, it can be divided into multiple εἰδή which are manifested in various human functions (ἔργα) and ways of life (βιοῖ). In the second chapter, I examine Aristotle’s account of natural slavery. I argue that Aristotle’s defense of natural slavery concerns slavery as a natural or biological phenomenon (SNBP) rather than slavery as a political phenomenon (SPP). In the third chapter, I examine the reproductive role of the female in the Generation of Animals. I argue that the female, in Aristotle’s view, also contributes seed and form. Aristotle’s reproductive hylomorphism, thus understood, is not at odds with his theory of inheritance in GA IV.3. In the fourth chapter, I investigate the role of “innate virtue” in human moral development. I argue that the two-stage theory of moral development in NE VI is in fact a simplified version of Aristotle’s three-stage theory. In the fifth chapter, I defend Aristotle’s Naturalness Thesis (NT) in the Politics. I argue that Aristotle’s NT is a serious philosophical claim that is consistent with Aristotle’s metaphysical system. In the final chapter, I look into the problem of human happiness in Aristotle. I argue that the life-long exercise of one single virtue – as long as it is exercised in its complete or perfect form – will, according to Aristotle, suffice for human happiness.