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Article: Peer Effects in Corporate Governance Practices: Evidence from Universal Demand Laws

TitlePeer Effects in Corporate Governance Practices: Evidence from Universal Demand Laws
Authors
Foroughi, PMarcus, ANguyen, VTehranian, H
Issue Date2021
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/
Citation
The Review of Financial Studies, 2021, Epub 2021-03-04 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhab025
AbstractFirms in the same networks tend to have similar corporate governance practices. However, disentangling peer effects, where governance practices propagate from one firm to another, from selection effects, where firms with similar preferences self-select into linked groups, is difficult to do. Studying board-interlocked firms, we utilize the staggered adoption of universal demand laws across states to identify and estimate causal peer effects in governance policies. We find support for the existence of peer effects in the adoption of antitakeover provisions. The impact of universal demand laws on the governance experience of interlocking directors likely explains these effects.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/297664
ISSN
0893-9454
2023 Impact Factor: 6.8
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 17.654
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000736102600004

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorForoughi, P-
dc.contributor.authorMarcus, A-
dc.contributor.authorNguyen, V-
dc.contributor.authorTehranian, H-
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-23T04:20:03Z-
dc.date.available2021-03-23T04:20:03Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citationThe Review of Financial Studies, 2021, Epub 2021-03-04-
dc.identifier.issn0893-9454-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/297664-
dc.description.abstractFirms in the same networks tend to have similar corporate governance practices. However, disentangling peer effects, where governance practices propagate from one firm to another, from selection effects, where firms with similar preferences self-select into linked groups, is difficult to do. Studying board-interlocked firms, we utilize the staggered adoption of universal demand laws across states to identify and estimate causal peer effects in governance policies. We find support for the existence of peer effects in the adoption of antitakeover provisions. The impact of universal demand laws on the governance experience of interlocking directors likely explains these effects.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Review of Financial Studies-
dc.rightsPre-print: Journal Title] ©: [year] [owner as specified on the article] Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of xxxxxx]. All rights reserved. Pre-print (Once an article is published, preprint notice should be amended to): This is an electronic version of an article published in [include the complete citation information for the final version of the Article as published in the print edition of the Journal.] Post-print: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in [insert journal title] following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [insert complete citation information here] is available online at: xxxxxxx [insert URL that the author will receive upon publication here].-
dc.titlePeer Effects in Corporate Governance Practices: Evidence from Universal Demand Laws-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailNguyen, V: nguyenvq@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityNguyen, V=rp02320-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/rfs/hhab025-
dc.identifier.hkuros321877-
dc.identifier.volumeEpub 2021-03-04-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000736102600004-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-
dc.identifier.issnl0893-9454-

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