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Conference Paper: Agent competition double auction mechanism
Title | Agent competition double auction mechanism |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Strategy-proof Double Auction Pair-related Cost Mechanism Design |
Issue Date | 2004 |
Citation | IIE Annual Conference and Exhibition 2004, 2004, p. 1099-1104 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We propose an agent competition double auction (AC-DA) mechanism in this paper. The AC-DA mechanism is strategy-proof, individual rational, and weakly budget-balanced if the general "agents are substitutes" condition is satisfied. The AC-DA mechanism also achieves asymptotic efficiency when applied to the exchange environment with pair-related costs (e.g., the transportation costs) between buyers and sellers. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296257 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chu, Leon Y. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shen, Zuo Jun Max | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-11T04:53:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-11T04:53:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | IIE Annual Conference and Exhibition 2004, 2004, p. 1099-1104 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296257 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We propose an agent competition double auction (AC-DA) mechanism in this paper. The AC-DA mechanism is strategy-proof, individual rational, and weakly budget-balanced if the general "agents are substitutes" condition is satisfied. The AC-DA mechanism also achieves asymptotic efficiency when applied to the exchange environment with pair-related costs (e.g., the transportation costs) between buyers and sellers. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IIE Annual Conference and Exhibition 2004 | - |
dc.subject | Strategy-proof | - |
dc.subject | Double Auction | - |
dc.subject | Pair-related Cost | - |
dc.subject | Mechanism Design | - |
dc.title | Agent competition double auction mechanism | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-30044444621 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1099 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1104 | - |