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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/deci.12157
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84940042303
- WOS: WOS:000360500100002
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Article: Risk Mitigation Benefit from Backup Suppliers in the Presence of the Horizontal Fairness Concern
Title | Risk Mitigation Benefit from Backup Suppliers in the Presence of the Horizontal Fairness Concern |
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Authors | |
Keywords | And Fairness Concern Supply Chain Management Option Contract Supply Risk |
Issue Date | 2015 |
Citation | Decision Sciences, 2015, v. 46, n. 4, p. 663-696 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2015 Decision Sciences Institute. The backup supply strategy is demonstrated as an effective approach to mitigating supply risk. We study a supply chain in which a leader manufacturer designs a contract to a potential backup supplier to mitigate the yield uncertainty of the primary supplier. In this context, the backup supplier may compare with the primary supplier and have horizontal fairness concerns. We model the contract design problem using a Stackelberg game and characterize the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and backup supplier, in both fairness and off-fairness settings. The theoretical results show that the leader manufacturer must sacrifice his own payoff to balance the payoffs of both suppliers. As a result, using a self-interested backup supplier is the dominating strategy, whereas using a fair-minded backup supplier is only suggested when the reliability of the primary supplier is low and the fairness concern of the backup supplier is not strong. Additionally, the backup supplier only benefits from fairness concerns when the level is not exceeding a threshold value. With regard to high fairness levels beyond this threshold, fairness concern has negative effects on the monetary payoff and even might lead to loss of the business. By conducting laboratory experiments, we provide evidence of the horizontal fairness concern from the backup supplier. Further, we show that if the primary supplier also has horizontal fairness concerns, the leader manufacturer can conditionally benefit from a promoted yield reliability due to an extra effort from the primary supplier. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296111 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.8 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.145 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chen, Junlin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhao, Xiaobo | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shen, Zuo Jun | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-11T04:52:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-11T04:52:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Decision Sciences, 2015, v. 46, n. 4, p. 663-696 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0011-7315 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296111 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2015 Decision Sciences Institute. The backup supply strategy is demonstrated as an effective approach to mitigating supply risk. We study a supply chain in which a leader manufacturer designs a contract to a potential backup supplier to mitigate the yield uncertainty of the primary supplier. In this context, the backup supplier may compare with the primary supplier and have horizontal fairness concerns. We model the contract design problem using a Stackelberg game and characterize the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and backup supplier, in both fairness and off-fairness settings. The theoretical results show that the leader manufacturer must sacrifice his own payoff to balance the payoffs of both suppliers. As a result, using a self-interested backup supplier is the dominating strategy, whereas using a fair-minded backup supplier is only suggested when the reliability of the primary supplier is low and the fairness concern of the backup supplier is not strong. Additionally, the backup supplier only benefits from fairness concerns when the level is not exceeding a threshold value. With regard to high fairness levels beyond this threshold, fairness concern has negative effects on the monetary payoff and even might lead to loss of the business. By conducting laboratory experiments, we provide evidence of the horizontal fairness concern from the backup supplier. Further, we show that if the primary supplier also has horizontal fairness concerns, the leader manufacturer can conditionally benefit from a promoted yield reliability due to an extra effort from the primary supplier. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Decision Sciences | - |
dc.subject | And Fairness Concern | - |
dc.subject | Supply Chain Management | - |
dc.subject | Option Contract | - |
dc.subject | Supply Risk | - |
dc.title | Risk Mitigation Benefit from Backup Suppliers in the Presence of the Horizontal Fairness Concern | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/deci.12157 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84940042303 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 46 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 663 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 696 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1540-5915 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000360500100002 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0011-7315 | - |